

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE – POLITICAL ASPECTS

It is widely acknowledged that one of the main subjects of environmental sustainability is the issue of distributive justice. In fact environmentalism and justice share one thing in common – both notions are strongly concerned about actual or increasing scarcity. Previously, the authors of *Limits to Growth* argued that the Earth can have only a limited amount of non-renewable natural resources as well as a limited capacity for absorbing the waste created by productive activity. As the consequence of the population enlargement and resources decline, also the portion of each individual becomes shortened. This picture shows that political environmentalism, basically founded on *The Limits to Growth*, puts scarcity as one of the main organizing concerns. If scarcity is a central point both to political environmentalism and to the idea of distributive justice, so it should be assumed that political environmentalism has distributive justice at the heart of its discourse.

In a typical liberal theory of justice it seems that justice is reserved to humans only. John Rawls puts the question: *On what grounds <...> do we distinguish between mankind and other living things and the regard the constraints of justice as holding only in our relations to human beings* [5, p. 504].

From this point of view, at least, we can see that only animals can have a conception of good and sense of justice, and as a consequence of it, our conduct towards nonhuman animals should not be regulated by the principles of justice.

Also, Michael Walzer – one of the main contemporary communitarian philosophers – strengthens his theory of justice in the area of equal rights reserved to human beings. Like Rawls he argues that: *By virtue of what characteristics are we one another's equals?* [6, p. 314]. Walzer's statement can simply prove that only human beings, because they are treated as culture-proving creatures, have exclusive rights to belong to the community of justice, and the other non-human animals and the rest of non-human natural world has to remain out of it.

David Cooper seems to present an interesting argumentation in the following research. He states: *Whatever the crucial determinant of moral concern – happiness, rights, sentiment – the argument is irrational to restrict such concerns to human beings, since the differences between ourselves and some other spheres which would alone justify such a restriction simply do not exist* [2, p. 139]. Undoubtedly Cooper's argumentation is appropriate. In some cases the dominant of moral concern might be more obvious towards the “subordinate” spheres.

After this short introduction the following question might arise: (1) Who are the recipients of environmental justice?; (2) What should be distributed?; (3) What is the principle of distribution? [1, pp. 291 – 292].

Each distribution about environmental justice is always connected with the problem of the future generations. In the next part of the paper this category is taken under consideration.

Environmental have always been divided according two categories: (1) those which have immediate effects and (2) those have delayed effects. The starting point in the discussion about environmental justice for future generation might be James Fishkin's statement: *no defensible theory of justice can neglect the fact that people are born and die and that our actions may have serious effects on the interests of those yet to be born* [3, p. 9]. If Fishkin is right the theories of social justice need to be applied not only to the contemporary conditions of everyday life but also projected for the future generations and we should not be satisfy for a theory justice unless it gives us convincing guarantee concerning distribution between present and the future.

On the other hand there are scientists who criticize the idea of justice for future

generation. Robert Heilbroner writes: *Why should I lift a finger to effect events that will have no more meaning from me seventy-five years after my death than those that happened seventy-five years before I was born? There is no rational answer to that terrible question* [4, p. 191]. Heilbroner comes out of assumption that there is no possibility to build intergenerational justice because the condition for relations of justice misses reciprocity – future generations cannot harm or benefit us.

However, any principle of justice can be defended when we consider biological human needs such as breathing, oxygen, health – those goods can be anticipated ahead for a long period of time. Especially, it should be considered in the context of climate changes in contemporary world.

Human use of the environment seems to accept a belief that the resources of the Planet play merely instrumental role. Without any hesitation we can say that we live in the World where global threats of consuming natural resources, environment devastation, excessive demographic growth and permanent dissatisfaction of people became the fact. In contemporary liberal thought theorists devoted attention to social and economic justice but it seems they have not taken enough consideration towards a justice for natural resources. Undoubtedly, belongs to the first philosophers who started a meaningful discourse in the area of social justice but he has obviously ignored the idea of environmental justice. Of course there have been some green political thinkers who have attempted to defend more environmentally conscious theories of justice. It seems that as the first the Brundtland report stated that inequality is the planet's main environmental problem, thereby confirming Commission's belief that policies for greater material equality are the most crucial elements in any formula of measures focused on environmental sustainability.

1. Bell D., *Environmental justice and Rawls' difference principle*, "Environmental Ethics" 2004 (Fall), Vol. 26.

2. Cooper D., *Other spaces and moral reason*, [in:] D. Cooper, J. Palmer, *Just environments: intergenerational, international and interspaces issues*, Routledge, London 1995.

3. J. Fishkin J., *The dialog of justice: Toward a self-reflective society*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1992.

4. R. Heilbroner R., *What has posterity ever done for me?* [in:] E. Partridge (ed.), *Responsibilities to future generations*, Prometheus Books, New York 1981.

5. Rawls J., *A theory of justice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1973. 6. Walzer M., *Spheres of justice: A defence of pluralism and equality*, Blackwell, Oxford 1983.

O.M. Polinkevych

Wschodnioeuropejski Uniwersytet Narodowy im. Łesi Ukrainki

WYBÓR PODEJŚĆ DO TWORZENIA STRATEGII INNOWACJI PRZEDSIĘBIORSTW

Ze względu na stopień skomplikowania, ciągłe zmiany i niepewność, radykalne podejście do strategii innowacji dominuje w praktyce i na uczelniach ekonomicznych [0]. Te podejście jest mniej przydatne niż podejście stopniowe, zakładające nieustanne dostosowywanie się w reakcji na nową wiedzę i zdobywane doświadczenia. Wybór podejścia zależy od definiowania i urzeczywistniania strategii innowacji. David Teece i Gary Pisano wyróżnili trzy elementy korporacyjnej strategii innowacji:

- 1) pozycję wobec konkurencji i w kraju;
- 2) ścieżki technologiczne;
- 3) procesy organizacyjne i zarządzanie.

W literaturze są dwa podejścia do strategii innowacji: racjonalistyczne (planistyczne, twórca I. Ansoff [0]) i inkrementalne (ewolucyjne, twórca H. Mintzberg [0]). Samo podejście